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Chapter 1
The Immigration-Emigration Nexus 
in Non-EU Sending States: A Focus 




In recent years, the topic of migrants’ access to social protection has increasingly 
become an issue of concern amongst scholars, policy makers and citizens alike 
(Ruhs and Palme 2018). Yet, this interplay between migration and welfare has 
gained much more salience in some world regions than in others, being intensively 
discussed especially in the European Union (EU). The rising interest on how 
European welfare states adapt to international mobility is due to a combination of 
factors that points towards the peculiarity of this region. On the one hand, it can be 
seen as a direct effect of the accelerated migration inflows that EU countries have 
witnessed during the last decades, coupled with worrying levels of vulnerability 
faced by migrant populations, especially in times of economic crisis (Vintila and 
Lafleur 2020 in volume 1 of this series). On the other hand, the rising societal oppo-
sition towards migrants’ access to welfare in Europe and the increasing politicisa-
tion of this topic in some EU destination countries (Lafleur and Stanek 2017; Ruhs 
and Palme 2018; Schmidt et al. 2018) have further contributed to the academic and 
political attention to the openness or closure of European social protection systems 
to mobile individuals.
Consequently, an extensive body of literature has examined how EU countries 
treat international migrants in terms of their access to welfare. Some pieces of work 
have focused exclusively on welfare-related dynamics among intra-EU migrants. In 
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doing so, they aimed to examine the articulation between free movement and social 
policy in a context in which the EU’s supranational legislation on non- discrimination 
and social security coordination has progressively facilitated mobile Europeans’ 
access to welfare in their EU home and host countries (Martinsen 2005; Blauberger 
and Schmidt 2014; Kramer et  al. 2018; Schmidt et  al. 2018, among others). 
Additionally, recent studies have also paid attention to third-country nationals resid-
ing in the EU, a group that faces not only higher risk of poverty and social exclu-
sion, but also more institutional barriers for accessing welfare benefits in EU 
destination countries (European Migration Network 2014; Lafleur and Vintila 2020a).
Despite these rich theoretical and empirical contributions regarding the interplay 
between mobility and welfare, the existing literature on this topic still faces major 
limitations. First, by mainly examining how the host country’s welfare configuration 
treats international migrants, past studies have often neglected the fact that mobile 
individuals can also benefit from certain levels of social protection from their origin 
countries. The diaspora literature shows that home countries often develop a wide 
repertoire of policy initiatives to keep links with their nationals abroad (Agunias and 
Newland 2012; Collyer 2013; Ragazzi 2014; Delano 2018; Gamlen 2019). In some 
cases, this also covers specific policies and programs aiming to ensure the social 
protection of non-resident nationals, especially those facing strong economic hard-
ship (Lafleur and Vintila 2020b). Second, in the attempt to measure migrants’ access 
to welfare, past studies have mainly adopted a Eurocentric perspective by closely 
examining the real and anticipated consequences of human mobility on European 
social protection systems. However, the historical development and recent achieve-
ments of European welfare states make them a unique case study; and many socio-
economic and welfare-related dynamics witnessed across European democracies 
may not be easily generalizable worldwide. In fact, the way in which non-European 
welfare states respond to international mobility still stands out as a grey area in 
migration and social policy literature, as very few studies have focused on the nexus 
between migration and welfare beyond the EU context. Even when extending the 
scope of the analysis beyond the EU, most studies have rather explored informal 
strategies and practices of transnational social protection of non- EU migrants in 
European countries and their families left in the homeland, rather than systemati-
cally analysing how they access welfare benefits from origin countries (see Boccagni 
2011; Sainsbury 2012; Merla and Baldassar 2011; Lafleur and Vivas Romero 2018).
This volume seeks to address this research gap by taking the perspective of non-
 EU countries on migrant social protection. In doing so, we address the following 
research questions: What type of social protection policies do non-EU sending 
countries adopt for their nationals abroad, including those residing in EU Member 
States? Do non-EU countries grant a differentiated access to social benefits for their 
emigrant populations when compared to foreign or national citizens residing in their 
territory? In other words, do non-EU states treat immigrants and emigrants differ-
ently when it comes to social protection? By providing an in-depth analysis of these 
questions, this volume thus complements the other two books included in this series 
(Lafleur and Vintila 2020a, b) that closely examine the interplay between migration 
and social protection in Europe and beyond.
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Our analysis focuses on a sample of 12 sending countries for migrants residing in 
the EU (Argentina, China, Ecuador, India, Lebanon, Morocco, Senegal, Serbia, 
Switzerland, the Russian Federation, Tunisia, and Turkey), plus the United Kingdom 
(UK) after the Brexit referendum. This sample of 12 non-EU countries is particularly 
relevant for our purposes for several reasons. To begin with, these countries are dis-
tributed across different world regions (first step of our case selection process) and 
they count with a population of more than three million individuals (second step, 
aiming to exclude from the analysis very small states which may put forward rather 
distinctive social policy and migration patterns). These countries also have signifi-
cant shares of nationals abroad (their diaspora worldwide accounts for more than 1% 
of their total population- third step) and a substantial segment of their diaspora (more 
than 40%) resides in the EU (fourth step). Their diaspora has a significant presence 
across several EU Member States, by being in the top five foreign nationalities in at 
least two EU countries (fifth step). Finally, these 12 countries are stable states (with 
a score of 10 or less in the 2016 State Fragility Index and Matrix- sixth step),1 while 
also counting with sufficient variation in the historical development of their welfare 
regimes (seventh selection criterion). The United Kingdom that was, until recently, 
an EU Member State, was added to this volume as it represents a quite peculiar case. 
Just like other countries analysed in this book, the UK counts with a significant dias-
pora abroad, although a smaller share of its non- resident population (around 25%) 
lives in EU countries. Nevertheless, UK citizens are in the top five foreign nationali-
ties residing in more than a half of current EU Member States (Lafleur and Vintila 
2020c); and interesting changes in access to social protection of the UK diaspora in 
the EU and of EU citizens in the UK are likely to occur in the future.
Two chapters are dedicated in this volume to each one of these 13 countries. For 
each country, the first chapter focuses on access to social benefits across five core 
policy areas (health care, unemployment, old-age pensions, family benefits, guaran-
teed minimum resources) by highlighting the type of social protection policies 
offered to national residents, non-national residents, and non-resident nationals. For 
each policy area, we look at a rather broad array of social benefits including: bene-
fits in kind and cash in case of sickness, invalidity benefits, unemployment insur-
ance and assistance benefits, contributory and non-contributory old-age pensions, 
maternity, paternity, parental and child benefits, and social assistance programs (see 
Vintila and Lafleur 2020 for a more detailed description of these benefits). The sec-
ond chapter for each case study discusses the role of three key actors (consulates, 
diaspora institutions, and home country ministries/agencies responsible for specific 
social policy areas) through which non-EU countries interact with their nationals 
abroad across the five policy areas previously mentioned (see further details in 
Lafleur and Vintila 2020c).
1 This index was developed by the Integrated Network for Social Conflict and Research (INSCR) 
and it covers all independent countries in the world with a population of more than 500,000 in 
2016. For each country, the fragility score takes into account aspects related to effectiveness and 
legitimacy across four performance dimensions: security, political, economic and social. See: 
https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. Accessed 16 March 2020.
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For each country, the data for both chapters are based on two surveys with 
national experts (one survey for the first chapter on access to social protection and 
another survey for the second chapter on diaspora policies and institutions). The 
surveys were conducted in the framework of the ERC-funded project “Migration 
and Transnational Social Protection in (Post) Crisis Europe” (MiTSoPro);2 and they 
included standardised questions to ensure the comparability of our findings across 
countries counting with different welfare and migration features. For each survey 
(see details in the introductory chapters of volumes 1 and 2 in this series), national 
experts were asked to provide objective information regarding the eligibility condi-
tions for accessing social benefits (first survey) and diaspora policies and initiatives 
for nationals abroad (second survey).
1.2  Social Policy Developments in Non-EU Contexts
Broadly speaking, the development of welfare and social policies in non-European 
contexts has historically followed a quite different path when compared to the EU 
(for an overview of EU countries, see Lafleur and Vintila 2020a). This has attracted 
an increasing scholarly interest on how non-European welfare regimes have the 
potential to challenge or redefine different typologies of ideal social policy models 
that have emerged after the seminal work of Esping-Andersen (1990) on the Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (see Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997; Österman et al. 2019, 
among others). However, the variation across non-EU social protection 
schemes— sometimes closely linked to very distinctive historical, economic, politi-
cal or societal traits than the ones observed in the EU- makes their categorization 
into existing “ideal” social policy models rather difficult (see Rudra 2007 or 
Mkandawire 2016 for more detailed discussions on how existing typologies over-
look varieties of welfare capitalism in developing countries). This is particularly the 
case considering that “one size fits all” typologies strongly clash not only with the 
diversity of welfare institutions and provisions between different regions around the 
globe, but also with increasing cross-country differences even within the geographi-
cal boundaries of the same world region.
Currently, there are still major differences across non-EU countries between 
those counting with rather generous welfare regimes (mostly present in wealthier 
high-income states) and the welfare state of developing countries that often remains 
hybrid, heavily fragmented and relatively fragile. The latter is observable especially 
across countries in more volatile economic contexts with significant macro- economic 
imbalances in which specific benefits rather generalised across EU welfare states 
either do not exist or have been replaced by different (often less institutionalised) 
2 http://labos.ulg.ac.be/socialprotection/. Accessed 16 March 2020. The survey was conducted 
between April 2018–January 2019 and several rounds of consistency check were centrally con-
ducted by the MiTSoPro team. Given the period in which the survey was conducted, the country 
chapters included in this volume focus mainly on the policies in place at the beginning of 2019.
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social protection initiatives. In many of these countries (including several of the 
countries analysed in this volume), the development of welfare institutions and pro-
visions has often encountered similar socio-economic challenges, including rising 
levels of poverty and increasing income and class-related disparities. As we will 
explain in this book, policy makers have sometimes attempted to address these chal-
lenges via processes of policy diffusion or, more broadly, policy convergence, with 
some countries implementing welfare schemes previously institutionalised in other 
contexts, by adapting them to the specificities of domestic receiving environments.
By way of example, Barrientos (2009) argues that until the 1980s, the develop-
ment of welfare institutions in Latin America was largely influenced by the conser-
vative welfare regime of several European countries, particularly when it comes to 
the support offered to families in protecting male breadwinners via occupationally 
stratified insurance schemes. However, unlike their European counterparts, Latin 
American welfare regimes restricted the level of protection and insurance only for 
workers engaged in formal employment. Given this distinguishable peculiarity, until 
the 1980s, the Latin American welfare state was considered as rather hybrid or con-
servative-informal (see also Carmona Barrenechea et al. this volume). Nevertheless, 
as Barrientos (2009) points out, recent reforms shifted this paradigm towards a “lib-
eral-informal” social policy model operating in a context of increasing unemploy-
ment rates, poverty and income inequalities in the region. Additionally, in response 
to poverty reduction targets, new social assistance programs have recently emerged, 
thus introducing new forms of protection disconnected from the labour market. Yet, 
these similar social policy influences or developments did not automatically lead to 
a harmonization of welfare regimes across Latin American states, as significant 
cross-country variations still exist (Riesco 2009). Franzoni (2008) mapped out 18 
Latin American countries into three main clusters of welfare regimes, showing that 
the two Latin American states analysed in this volume respond to quite different 
social policy features. On the one side, Argentina shows higher decommodification, 
stronger formalisation of labour and income levels, higher public expenditure and a 
system targeting the poor, with many of these features being also present in other 
Latin American cases, such as Chile. On the other hand, Ecuador (together with 
Colombia, Peru or Guatemala, among others) has been characterised for a long time 
by low decommodification of the labour force, limited levels of occupied salaried 
workers, limited Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, low social policy expen-
diture and a largely informal labour market in which families play a significant role 
for risk management. As also discussed in this volume, Ecuador reshaped its domes-
tic social policy since 2007, with the consolidation of labour protection and a series 
of executive decrees aiming to secure immediate investments for education and 
health care, thus shifting towards a more universal model.
Certain welfare-related similarities and European-driven influences can also be 
found across other countries in the Global South. In many of them, the development 
of welfare arrangements has been shaped after social protection schemes already 
operating across European countries, often as a direct consequence of colonial inter-
ference or more indirect colonial legacies, in general. India received strong colonial 
influences in the development of its welfare regime, with many of its current social 
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security arrangements and labour regulations being influenced by the country’s 
colonial past. Although the country has experienced strong economic growth and 
managed to reduce the ratio of people living in extreme poverty,3 social inequality 
and uneven access to social protection persist. As highlighted in this volume, the 
Indian welfare system remains highly fragmented, with formal workers receiving 
more generous social security arrangements following the colonial legacy; and a 
large share of the labour force working in the informal sector without access to 
social security schemes.
On the other hand, countries from the Middle East and North Africa, such as 
Morocco or Tunisia, have witnessed for a long time populist state welfare provi-
sions in which the state provided for its citizens in return for their loyalty to the 
regime (Harrigan and El-Said 2014). The first modern type of social security 
schemes emerged in Tunisia when the country was under the French protectorate, 
but significant reforms have been implemented after the independence (Gelb and 
Marouani this volume). These reforms led to substantial progress in terms of 
strengthening state’s role in social provisioning with high social spending, a devel-
opment of social security institutions, and the adoption of new social protection 
schemes for the unemployed and the poor (Cheikh 2013; Harrigan and El-Said 
2014). Yet, economic growth and high employment rates continue to be concen-
trated in specific areas only (Amara and Ayadi 2013); and informal econ-
omy—  together with limited social coverage mainly affecting low-income and 
vulnerable individuals— remains a top priority to be addressed via structural policy 
reforms (Cheikh 2013). As explained in this book, Morocco also maintains some 
welfare arrangements and institutions strongly influenced by its past as French pro-
tectorate. One of the main challenges faced by the Moroccan welfare state is the 
inadequacy of its social assistance program for the most vulnerable, despite recent 
reforms incentivized by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, aim-
ing to reduce the poverty rate (Harrigan and El-Said 2014). The situation is even 
more complicated in Senegal. This country has been characterised as a “cash crop 
economy” (Mkandawire 2016) in which social protection is often informal and 
community-based, with limited public spending on welfare. As shown in this vol-
ume, the Senegalese welfare system is actually a legacy from France, with its first 
pillars being established long before the 1960 independence.
Certain social policy developments strongly influenced by the EU or with signifi-
cant similarities with other European welfare states can also be observed in Turkey, 
Switzerland, and the UK. The Europeanisation process has strongly affected the 
development of social policy arrangements in Turkey. As highlighted in this book, 
the country has witnessed significant welfare reforms, especially since the 
mid- 2000s. In light of these changes (including the attempts to implement a single 
pension system, the adoption of a universal health insurance, the unification of 
social security institutions or the restructuring of social assistance programs), 
Aybars and Tsarouhas (2010) evaluate the Turkish social policy model as a rather 
3 See: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/india/overview. Accessed 16 March 2020.
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hybrid one. They argue that Turkey combines important elements of the Middle 
Eastern welfare regime (with religion playing a significant role and social policies 
following more the idea of nation-building, rather than the one of social citizenship 
rights) and the South European one (with low social expenditure, strong reliance on 
families for welfare provision, and fragmented welfare delivery). On the other hand, 
the well-developed Swiss and UK welfare regimes share significant social policy 
traits with EU Member States. The Anglo-Saxon welfare regime in the UK is usu-
ally defined by weak universalism, free health care services, and social benefits for 
individuals in need in which means-testing plays a significant role. Many of these 
social policy features can also be observed in Ireland and, to a lesser extent, in Malta 
(Vintila and Lafleur 2020). In turn, Switzerland, unlike other European countries, 
implemented social insurance programs relatively late (Trampusch 2010). Until the 
1970s, the Swiss welfare regime was considered as a liberal one, although subse-
quent reforms shifted the country towards a conservative and continental welfare 
state that still preserves important features of a liberal social policy model 
(Armingeon 2001).
The rest of the countries analysed in this volume also put forward significant 
diversity in the development and main rationale of their welfare systems. 
Russia— which has witnessed strong economic performance and recent social pol-
icy reforms aiming to introduce residual, neo-liberal welfare arrangements- has 
been categorised by Cerami (2009) as an oil-led welfare state in which high oil and 
gas prices have significantly shaped the contemporary social protection system. 
Most of the welfare-related reforms implemented since 1989 targeted the privatisa-
tion of provisions, management decentralisation, strengthening the social insurance 
principle and the implementation of a residual unemployment protection scheme 
coupled with basic safety nets (Cook 2000; Cerami 2009). China has also experi-
enced impressive economic growth since the market-oriented reforms initiated in 
the 1980s, up to the point that today, it represents the second largest world economy. 
This economic performance is reflected in indicators such as the increase of the 
GDP or workers’ wages. Yet, significant challenges including regional and class 
disparities or strong inequalities in accessing basic education or health care (espe-
cially in rural areas) remain to be addressed (London 2014; He this volume).
Finally, Serbia and Lebanon also respond to rather distinct social policy models. 
Social policy development in Serbia has been strongly influenced by the legacy of 
the communist welfare regime. The post-communist Serbian welfare system has 
been characterized by reduced social spending during the transition, high share of 
private sources in health care, low social assistance coverage and high number of 
pension beneficiaries, with facilitated early retirement aiming to solve increasing 
unemployment rates (Stambolieva 2013). As shown in the country chapters in this 
volume, most attempts to reform the Serbian welfare system took place especially 
since the 2000s, although some of them were rather unsuccessful. As for Lebanon, 
the development of its welfare regime highlights the importance of non-state actors 
(religious charities, sectarian parties) in a context of fragile state-related welfare 
institutions, fragmented social protection schemes, minimal public provisions and 
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increasing socio-economic challenges of human impoverishment (Jawad 2002; 
Cammett and Issar 2010; Tabar et al. this volume).
This diversity in social policy developments across the 13 countries included in 
our sample is also reflected in their varying levels of social protection expenditure 
(Table 1.1) and effective coverage (Table 1.2). As shown in Table 1.1, total social 
protection expenditure as share of the GDP still varies widely across these coun-
tries, with some of them (India, Lebanon, Senegal) allocating 5% or less on social 
protection. This is in clear contrast with countries such as Serbia, Switzerland, the 
UK or the Russian Federation in which social protection expenditure accounts for 
more than 15% of the GDP. By type of schemes, the expenditure ratio is generally 
higher for older persons. For instance, Argentina, Russia, Serbia or Turkey spend 
8% or more of their GDP for the protection of the elderly, whereas the resources 
dedicated to this group in Senegal, Ecuador, Lebanon, China or Morocco are much 
lower. Public expenditure for children or individuals in active age (including expen-
diture for unemployment, labour market programs, sickness-related benefits or 
social assistance) is usually more reduced than for old-age; and generally higher in 
Serbia, Argentina, Switzerland, the UK, and Russia. Across these 13 countries, pub-
lic expenditure is extremely limited especially for sickness and maternity (0.3% of 
the GDP or less in India, Senegal, Turkey, Ecuador) and general social assistance 
(0.3% or less in Morocco, Senegal, Ecuador, China, Turkey).
In any case, a higher allocation of public resources for specific groups does not 
necessarily mean that these groups are well secured against vulnerability or social 
risks, as social protection expenditure may still be insufficient to cover a large num-
ber of persons in need. Table 1.2 compares the social protection effective coverage 
across the selected countries. India and Ecuador report a very limited effective cov-
erage, especially when compared to Switzerland, the UK or Russia. By specific 
groups, effective coverage tends to be higher for older persons (except for Senegal, 
Lebanon, India, Turkey, Morocco or Tunisia) and children (except for China or 
Senegal, from the countries for which the data is available), when compared to 
unemployed or other vulnerable groups.
As discussed in several chapters in this book, this rather limited social protection 
coverage, especially for individuals in working age, is often linked to high levels of 
informal employment. This structural problem of informality has serious implica-
tions on (national and foreign) workers’ formal access to welfare. Informal employ-
ment reaches very high rates especially in Senegal, India, and Morocco, where 
informality is 80% or more of employment (Fig. 1.1). Thus, very limited segments 
of the population of these countries can actually benefit from social protection poli-
cies linked to formal employment status. Ecuador, Tunisia, China, and Argentina 
also return very high shares (more than 40%) of informal employment, thus also 
excluding significant proportions of the population from employment-based wel-
fare entitlements. Informal employment is much more limited in Serbia, Switzerland, 
and the UK.  Turkey returns the highest difference by gender, with the share of 
female workers in informal employment being much higher when compared to their 
male counterparts.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 1.1 Share of informal employment in total employment (%), by gender. (Source: Own elabo-
ration based on ILO (2018). Women and men in informal economy. A statistical picture (third 
edition), https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_626831/lang%2D%2Den/index.
htm. Accessed 16 March 2020. The data for Lebanon is not available)
Apart from their welfare and labour market characteristics, the countries anal-
ysed in this book also vary widely in the Human Development Index ranking (HDI, 
Table 1.3) and poverty levels (Fig. 1.2). Switzerland, the UK, Argentina, and Russia 
score quite high in the Human Development Index. Unsurprisingly, Switzerland 
returns a very high gross income per capita and higher life expectancy and years of 
schooling than any other country analysed here. Turkey, Serbia, Lebanon, Ecuador, 
China, and Tunisia also rank high in this index (top 100), although their gross 
national income is substantially smaller when compared to Switzerland, the Russian 
Federation, the UK or Argentina. Finally, Morocco and India report only a medium 
human development score, whereas Senegal occupies the last position in this rank 
among the 13 selected countries.
Important variations are also observable when looking at the evolution of the 
poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (as percentage of the population) 
across these countries (Fig. 1.2). In general, the share of those living below poverty 
lines has significantly decreased over time across all countries analysed, but espe-
cially so in India, Tunisia, Russia or China, due to reforms adopted during the past 
years. Yet, the poverty headcount ratio still reaches worrying levels especially in 
Senegal and Lebanon (46% and 27% respectively in 2012), but also in Argentina, 
Serbia, Ecuador or India (more than 20% in each case). On the other hand, both 











Ecuador Russian Federation Lebanon
India China
Fig. 1.2 Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population), 2000–2018. (Source: 
Own elaboration based on the data from the Global Poverty Working Group of the World Bank 
(https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC, accessed 16 March 2020). The figures for 
Switzerland and the UK are not available. The data for Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, and India are 
available only for specific non-consecutive years, but the dots are connected for consecutive years 
only for illustration purposes)



















Switzerland 0.944 83.5 13.4 57,625 2 Very high
UK 0.922 81.7 12.9 39,116 14 Very high
Argentina 0.825 76.7 9.9 18,461 47 Very high
Russian 
Federation
0.816 71.2 12.0 24,233 49 Very high
Turkey 0.791 76.0 8.0 24,804 65 High
Serbia 0.787 75.3 11.1 13,019 66 High
Lebanon 0.757 79.8 8.7 13,378 82 High
Ecuador 0.752 76.6 8.7 10,347 84 High
China 0.752 76.4 7.8 15,270 86 High
Tunisia 0.735 75.9 7.2 10,275 96 High
Morocco 0.667 76.1 5.5 7340 122 Medium
India 0.640 68.8 6.4 6353 129 Medium
Senegal 0.505 67.5 3.0 2384 165 Low
Source: Own elaboration based on the Human Index Development of the United Nations 
Development Programme, http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI. Accessed 16 March 2020
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Morocco and China have reduced their poverty headcount ratio at less than 5% 
according to the latest data available in each case.4
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that certain types of benefits rather gener-
alised across EU countries (Vintila and Lafleur 2020) have not yet been imple-
mented in some non-EU states (see also Fig. 1.7 in Sect. 1.4 of this chapter). An 
evident example is in the area of guaranteed minimum resources. Most countries 
examined here (Argentina, Ecuador, India, Lebanon, Senegal, Morocco, Tunisia or 
Russia) have not adopted yet general (non-categorical) social assistance schemes 
for the most vulnerable, although some of them do offer categorical social assis-
tance programs for specific groups such as children or the elderly. Similar examples 
can be found in the area of unemployment or family benefits. As discussed by Dioh 
(this volume), Senegal (which also returns the highest share of informal employ-
ment) has not adopted yet any formal mechanism to deal with the risk of job loss. 
Lebanon also lacks a formal unemployment insurance or assistance scheme, the 
only provision available being an end-of-service benefit for those affiliated to the 
social security system. In the area of family benefits, although all these countries 
offer maternity benefits for female employees, some of them have not implemented 
yet specific paternity benefits schemes, whereas parental benefits exist as such only 
in few cases such as Serbia or Russia. Moreover, not all these countries offer child 
benefits (see the chapters on China, India or Turkey); and in some of them, these 
benefits are not granted to all families with children (as it is often the case in the 
EU), but only to the most vulnerable ones. As an illustration, the Human Development 
Bonus in Ecuador is granted only to heads of families with children under the age 
of 18 who live in conditions of extreme poverty.
Secondly, as mentioned before, some of these countries have recently adopted 
important social policy reforms with certain benefits being introduced only in the 
last years. Argentina adopted its unemployment insurance scheme in 1991, the 
Universal Child Allowance in 2008 and it renationalised the pension system in 
2008. A social assistance scheme aiming to provide a safety net for the poor was 
introduced in China only in 1999 for the urban areas and in 2004 for the rural parts 
of the country. Similarly, India introduced its unemployment scheme in 2005, 
Ecuador did so in 2016, whereas Turkey experienced an important social security 
reform in 2006.
Thirdly, and even more importantly, despite recent attempts to introduce new 
social policy reforms, many of these countries still face major challenges to ensure 
individuals’ access to social protection, regardless of their nationality. As explained 
in the chapters, some states still put forward very stratified social protection regimes 
that protect only those formally affiliated to the social security system via employ-
ment or voluntary contributions. While employment is a crucial element for 
4 The data on the evolution of the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines is not available 
for the UK and Switzerland. However, Eurostat data shows that in 2018, 17.4% of individuals 
residing in Switzerland and 23.1% of those residing in the UK were considered at risk of poverty 
and social exclusion (compared to 21.6% for EU27). See: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data-
browser/view/sdg_01_10/default/table?lang=en. Accessed 16 March 2020.
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accessing welfare in many countries (including EU Member States, as shown by 
Vintila and Lafleur 2020), this condition becomes highly problematic in certain 
non-EU contexts in which the informal economy has a considerable weight. As 
discussed, many of the countries analysed here return  very high proportions of 
informal workers. Since inclusion in social protection schemes derives from formal 
employment, this directly excludes high proportions of the population- nationals 
and foreigners alike- from accessing welfare. Consequently, even when specific 
welfare schemes exist- such as the ones for unemployment or old-age pensions-, 
informal workers are a priori excluded given their lack of contributions; and the 
pool of potential beneficiaries of these programs implicitly becomes quite limited. 
As in more than a half of the countries analysed here up to 40% of the labour force 
is engaged in informal employment, this leads to a significant exclusion of both 
national and foreign residents from accessing formal programs to protect them 
against specific risks. Additionally, even when employment or prior contribution 
requirements are met, the benefit levels are sometimes too limited to ensure an 
effective protection. As discussed by He (this volume), the amount received for 
unemployment benefits in China is so low that it does not guarantee an adequate 
protection of those who lose their jobs. Similarly, the chapter of Popova (this vol-
ume) on the Russian case shows that, despite the fact that government transfers 
cover a rather large segment of the population, most cash benefits do not actually 
reach the subsistence level, the adequacy of the coverage offered by these programs 
thus remaining quite limited.
Overall, this differentiated institutionalization and development of the welfare 
regimes of the 13 countries analysed here could significantly shape their responsive-
ness to the inclusion of immigrant or diaspora populations in their national social 
protection systems. Countries counting with limited resources and fragile welfare 
arrangements face considerable difficulties to ensure a sufficient and efficient cov-
erage of the socio-economic needs of their resident nationals. Given these high pres-
sures that already exist on their domestic welfare systems, the social protection of 
migrants may not be a top national priority, especially when compared to the much 
larger group of national residents in need. On the other hand, having a more gener-
ous and well-developed welfare regime is not necessarily expected to act as a guar-
antee that a country would be more inclined to ensure migrants’ social protection. 
More developed welfare states may actually adopt a rather protectionist approach in 
trying to limit the number of beneficiaries potentially entitled to claim generous 
social benefits.
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1.3  Non-EU Welfare States 
and the Immigration-Emigration Nexus
As noted by Adamson and Tsourapas (2019), migration studies have often looked at 
the development of migration policies in the Global South by using analytical 
frameworks designed to understand migration regimes in the Global North. 
Consequently, migration policies of advanced economies such as EU Member 
States tend to be depicted primarily as guided by their role of immigrant receiving 
areas, while states in the Global South are mostly perceived as countries whose 
migration policies exclusively ought to deal with departure and transit. In volume 2 
of this series (Lafleur and Vintila 2020b), we questioned this representation by 
showing how EU Member States also engage with citizens abroad in the area of 
welfare and beyond. Similarly, this volume discusses the case of non-EU countries 
that—  while they represent important sending states of migrants coming to the 
EU—  are also frequently receiving immigrants. In other words, the articulation 
between the engagement of non-EU sending states with their diaspora and the way 
in which they protect foreigners residing in their territory remains largely 
understudied.
Unlike this volume, past attempts at examining this nexus between emigration 
and immigration policies have usually focused on single case studies that highlight 
contradictions in the way sending states treat citizens abroad and foreign residents. 
In Europe for instance, Zincone (2006) noted that Italy’s nationality law combined 
very generous features for emigrants’ descendants with strict criteria for immi-
grants’ descendants born in Italy. Similarly, other scholars also underlined in cases 
such as Mexico (Delano 2018) or Morocco (Cherti and Collyer 2015) that dis-
courses on immigration and policies for foreigners residing in those states do not 
necessarily match with the protective stance towards citizens abroad.
In this volume, we aim to push the analysis of the immigration-emigration nexus 
further by examining the inclusiveness of non-EU states’ welfare policies towards 
two categories of individuals in situation of international mobility: nationals resid-
ing abroad and foreigners residing in these countries. Before comparatively discuss-
ing our main findings for the 13 case studies, it is however important to distinguish 
them along demographic, political, and economic characteristics that are likely to 
create tensions— and possibly, contradictions- in the way these states treat emigrant 
and immigrant populations.
1.3.1  Demographic Pressures
The 13 countries included in our sample vary substantially in their historical migra-
tion trajectories, which could potentially constrain the way in which they define the 
access of minority populations to domestic welfare systems. As mentioned, all of 
them are relevant origin states for third-country nationals residing in the EU. Some 
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also host sizeable immigrant communities due to continuous inflows for a prolonged 
period. Figure 1.3 illustrates this diversity by capturing the demographic weight of 
immigrants and emigrants in each selected country. Although all countries return 
rather large foreign and diaspora populations in absolute terms, the relative shares 
that these groups represent from the total population still vary widely, as some states 
have much larger populations in general.
Two clusters emerge for each group (immigrants and emigrants). In the case of 
the diaspora, the first cluster groups countries (Argentina, China, India, Russia, 
Senegal, Tunisia, and Turkey) in which nationals abroad constitute a rather limited 
segment of the total population (5% or less). Hence, the non-resident populations of 
these countries have a more  reduced demographic visibility, although in some 
cases— e.g. India-, the diaspora is very sizeable in absolute numbers. The countries 
included in the second cluster (Ecuador, Switzerland, Serbia, the UK, Morocco, and 
Lebanon) return much higher shares of nationals abroad, up to 9% of the total popu-
lation in Lebanon. As for immigrants, in half of the countries analysed (China, 
Ecuador, India, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia, Turkey), their share is still quite limited- 





























% foreigners over total population
Fig. 1.3 Selected non-EU countries, by share of foreigners and diaspora over total population. 
(Source: Own elaboration. The data on stocks of foreign residents are from the UN dataset on 
International Migrant Stock, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
estimates2/estimates17.asp (accessed 16 March 2020). The data on diaspora stocks are from the 
DIOC-E 2010/2011 dataset (https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/ dioc.htm, accessed 16 March 2020), 
covering emigrant population across 91 destinations (34 OECD countries and 57 non-OECD 
states). The percentages are calculated based on the total population data from the UN dataset on 
World Population Prospects, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=population&d=PopDiv&f=variableI
D%3a12, accessed 16 March 2020. For both immigrants and emigrants, the reference year for the 
data is 2010)
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comprising the rest of the countries analysed, reaching up to 12% in the UK, 16.6% 
in Lebanon, and 26.6% in Switzerland, respectively.
Immigrants and emigrants thus count with varying levels of demographic visi-
bility across these countries and their demands for inclusion in the welfare system 
of these states may also vary significantly. When these minority groups are rela-
tively small in demographic terms, ensuring their access to welfare may have little 
costs for these countries as, a priori, few individuals would potentially qualify as 
eligible claimants. At the opposite pole, when these groups are particularly size-
able, granting them access to welfare rights could be a costly decision, although 
more meaningful in terms of impact (for a similar argument, see Vintila and Lafleur 
2020). In addition, states such as Lebanon, Switzerland, the UK or Serbia, which 
count with large numbers of immigrants and emigrants alike, may  also have to 








% nationals in high income countries over total diaspora population
% nationals in the EU over total diaspora population
% immigrants from high income countries over total immigrant population
% EU immigrants from the total immigrant population
Fig. 1.4 Migrants coming from or going to high income countries and EU Member States from 
the total immigrant and emigrant population of the 13 non-EU countries. (Source: Own elabora-
tion. The share of nationals residing in EU countries is calculated based on the DIOC-E 2010/2011 
dataset (https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm, accessed 16 March 2020) covering emigrant 
populations across 91 destinations (34 OECD countries and 57 non-OECD states). The shares of 
nationals residing in high income countries and the shares of immigrants originating from the EU 
and from high income countries are calculated based on the UN dataset on Migrant stocks by ori-
gin and destination (https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/esti-
mates2/estimates17.asp, accessed 16 March 2020). For all groups, the reference year for the data 
is 2010)
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1.3.2  Considerations Regarding the Composition 
of Migrant Stocks
Apart from size, the composition of migration  stocks may  also constrain states’ 
predisposition to ensure the access of mobile individuals to welfare. For instance, 
countries whose migrants come from or go to more economically developed 
states  (especially high-income countries with more generous welfare regimes) 
may have fewer incentives to address the social protection needs of these minority 
groups. Figure 1.4 shows that more than a half of the emigrant populations of almost 
all states analysed here resides in high-income countries, up to more than 90% for 
Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Switzerland, Ecuador, Lebanon, the UK, and China. 
Consequently, policy makers in the homeland may be less reactive to these diaspora 
communities if they assume that their welfare needs may be better addressed by the 
(sometimes more developed) social protection regimes of their host countries, pro-
vided they have legal residence in the latter.
Furthermore, more than a half of the diaspora population of Tunisia, Turkey, 
Morocco, Senegal, Serbia, and Switzerland resides in EU countries, up to more than 
90% for Tunisia. The share of non-resident nationals living in the EU is more mod-
erate- but still significant- for Ecuador, Russia, and Argentina (more than four out of 
10 emigrants from these countries reside in EU Member States); but substantially 
smaller for the UK, India or China. The case of Argentina, in particular, also allows 
us to underline another important element regarding the potential effect of the com-
position of migrant stocks on states’ responsiveness to migrants’ welfare. As shown 
by Gallo et  al. (2006) with recent Argentine immigration to Southern Europe, a 
varying share of these migrants coming to the EU are dual nationals who already 
possess the nationality of an EU Member State prior to arriving in Europe or have 
facilitated access to such nationality upon arrival. As also discussed by Margheritis 
(this volume), such situation may trigger sending states to be less active in protect-
ing their citizens abroad because of the assumption that the latter will be treated as 
nationals in the EU countries of settlement. More generally of course, the legal 
status (or undocumented status) of individuals in situation of international mobil-
ity— whether they are immigrants or emigrants— equally shapes the perception of 
state authorities about the necessity to intervene in favour of these populations.
Turning the scope to immigrants, only in Morocco, Switzerland, and China, 50% 
or more of foreign residents originate from high-income countries,5 this share being 
substantially smaller (less than 10%) for Senegal, Serbia, Russia, Lebanon, and 
India. In fact, in the latter two countries, only 1% of all immigrants come from 
high- income origin countries. The data also shows that, apart from Turkey and 
Switzerland in which half of all immigrants originate from EU Member States, in 
5 Besides the inflows of documented migrants, some of these countries have also received impor-
tant irregular flows, as it is the case with migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Morocco (see, for 
instance, the CARIM Migration Profile for Morocco, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/han-
dle/1814/22441/MP_Morocco_EN.pdf? sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 16 March 2020).
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all others, the majority of foreigners have a non-EU background (up to 99% for 
Lebanon, India or China).
This variation in migration flows to and from Europe compared to other regions 






















































































































































Fig. 1.5 Main origin countries of immigrants residing in the 13 non-EU countries (left side) and 
main destination countries of their nationals abroad (right side). Share over total immigrant and 
emigrant population of each non-EU country analysed. (Source: Own elaboration. The data on top 
destinations for the diaspora is from OECD (2015) “Connecting with emigrants: a global profile of 
diasporas 2015” and it refers to emigrants (defined as foreign-born individuals by country of birth 
and their children born in destination countries) aged 15+ across 84 selected destinations (33 
OECD countries and 51 non-OECD states)- reference year 2010/2011. The data on top origin 
countries of foreigners is from the UN dataset Trends in international migrant stock (reference year 
2010), https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates 
17.asp, accessed 16 March 2020)
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in these selected non-EU states, as well as the specific destination countries of their 
nationals abroad (Fig. 1.5). Unsurprisingly, among non-European destinations, the 
United States of America (USA), Australia or Canada stand out as the most impor-
tant host countries for the emigrant populations of the 13 countries analysed here. 
Significant outflows are also oriented towards EU destinations, mainly Italy, Spain, 
France, Germany, Belgium or the Netherlands. For Morocco and Serbia in particu-
lar, the main five destination countries of their diaspora are European countries. 
Figure 1.5 also confirms the tendency already highlighted for European diaspora 
populations (Lafleur and Vintila 2020c) of a high concentration of emigrants in 
particular destination countries only. For instance, the first two host countries of 
Argentinean, Ecuadorian, Indian, Moroccan, Senegalese, Tunisian or  Turkish 
nationals already sum up more than a half of the total diaspora of these countries, 
with more than 50% of all non-resident Tunisian or Turkish citizens being concen-
trated in one country in particular. In some cases, a common language and/or past 
colonial ties (the case of Indians in the UK, Argentines and Ecuadorians in Spain, 
UK citizens in Australia and the USA, or Moroccans in France) facilitate this selec-
tion of specific destination countries. Regardless of the reasons for diaspora’s geo-
graphical concentration in particular destinations, having a high share of nationals 
abroad residing in a specific state may also incentivize origin countries to become 
more attentive to the needs of that particular group.
The situation is more diverse when looking at the main origin countries of immi-
grants residing in these 13 countries. In China, Ecuador, India, Lebanon, Russia, 
and Senegal, the main immigrant groups originate from non-EU countries; and in 
Ecuador, India, and Lebanon, more than a half of all foreigners come from a single 
country. In Argentina, Morocco, Serbia, and Turkey, the first two migrant communi-
ties account for more than 50% of all immigrants, the demographic concentration of 
foreigners being more evenly distributed across different groups in the other coun-
tries analysed. Often, the most sizeable immigrant communities originate from 
neighbouring states (see the cases of India, Senegal, Serbia or Russia). In other 
cases, the presence of specific communities is due to strong migratory ties with 
origin countries (Italians in Argentina, Germans in Turkey, Indians and Pakistanis in 
the UK, or French nationals in Morocco).
1.3.3  Economic and Political Tensions
The size and composition of migrant stocks may influence states’ behaviour regard-
ing the social protection of minority groups, but so is the economic or political 
leverage that these communities might have on national governments. The example 
of diaspora populations helps us illustrate this point. As mentioned, based on the 
size of the diaspora, we can identify two clusters of countries. First, there are those 
counting with a relatively small diaspora in which nationals abroad account for 5% 
or less of the population (Argentina, China, India, Russia, Senegal, Tunisia, and 
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Turkey). The second cluster includes countries with more sizeable diaspora groups 
(Ecuador, Switzerland, Serbia, the UK, Morocco, Lebanon).
The first group of countries may not be particularly pro-active when it comes 
to diaspora’s inclusion into domestic welfare systems not only because of its rela-
tively small size, but also given that nationals abroad make a rather limited finan-
cial contribution to the homeland via remittances. As illustrated in Fig. 1.6, their 
remittances usually represent 0.5% or less of the GDP (higher in India and 
Tunisia). The clear exception from this first group is Senegal: although the 
Senegalese diaspora is relatively small, its impact for the homeland economy is 
particularly high since remittances sent from abroad account for more than 9% of 
the GDP. This, in turn, may raise awareness amongst policy makers in Senegal 
about the importance of the diaspora, thus making them more likely to become 
attentive to the needs of this population. At the opposite pole, policy makers in 
countries included in the second cluster are already faced with a strong demo-
graphic visibility of diaspora groups; and their responsiveness may  be further 
incentivised by the economic leverage of non-residents. This is particularly the 
case for Morocco, Serbia, and Lebanon, countries in which an important share of 
the GDP is due to diaspora’s remittances. This external financial help plays a rel-
evant role in boosting income in the homeland, including that of the most vulner-


























Remittances as % of the GDP
Fig. 1.6 Non-EU countries by share of diaspora (vertical axis) and remittances as share of the 
GDP (horizontal axis). (Source: Own elaboration. The data on remittances are from the World 
Bank dataset on Migrant Remittances Inflows (reference year 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=SN, accessed 16 Match 2020). See detailed 
sources for diaspora data in Fig. 1.3)
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Diaspora’s economic contribution may  thus shape how sending states behave 
towards this group; and this is even more likely to happen when nationals abroad 
also count with voting rights in homeland elections. All countries analysed here, 
except for China and India,6 grant voting rights to their non-resident citizens for 
national legislative and/or presidential elections (with important restrictions in the 
UK). As shown in past studies, emigrant turnout in homeland elections is influenced 
by different factors (party mobilization, voter registration requirements, etc.), but 
usually tends to be lower than that of domestic voters (Lafleur and Sánchez- 
Domínguez 2015; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 
2019). Yet, as demonstrated in the Turkish case, parties in sending states may try to 
appeal to voters abroad by developing policies to address specifically their needs 
(Mencutek and Baser 2018).
Similar economic and political constrains could also shape states’ inclusiveness 
towards immigrants. For instance, Switzerland stands out in our sample as the state 
with the highest share of immigrants, reaching up to 27% of the population. Overall, 
foreign-born individuals constitute 32% of all employees in Switzerland, with a 
high share (47%) working as managers, professionals, or technicians and associate 
professionals.7 Their strong economic leverage is further complemented by the fact 
that, in some Swiss cantons, foreigners also have the right to vote in  local and 
regional legislative elections and referendum, as well as in  local mayoral and 
regional presidential elections.8 At the opposite pole, in Turkey, for instance, for-
eigners account for a rather small share of the population. They also face rather 
unfavourable conditions in terms of labour market mobility, while being excluded 
from political participation as they cannot joint political parties, cannot vote nor 
have their own associations or media unless one of the directors is a Turkish citi-
zen.9 Consequently, this configuration of factors may  reduce the likelihood of 
Turkish authorities to become particularly responsive to their needs, including their 
social protection needs.
Drawing on these initial expectations, the next section maps out some of the 
main findings of the country chapters included in this volume regarding the way in 
which non-EU states respond to the inclusion of immigrant and emigrant popula-
tions in their domestic welfare regimes.
6 Despite ongoing discussions regarding the implementation of proxy voting, India allows non-
resident nationals to vote only if they travel back to India during the election day (see the diaspora 
chapter in this volume).
7 Eurostat data on Employees by migration status, educational attainment level, occupation and 
working time, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupDownloads.do. Accessed 16 March 
2020.
8 http://globalcit.eu/conditions-for-electoral-rights/. Accessed 16 March 2020.
9 See MIPEX results for Turkey, http://www.mipex.eu/turkey. Accessed 16 March 2020
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1.4  What Kind of Social Protection for Mobile Individuals 
Moving from/to Non-EU Countries?
1.4.1  Access to Social Protection for Foreigners: Between 
Equal Treatment and (In)Direct Disentitlement
The analysis of the 13 countries included in this book points towards interesting 
patterns of convergence in how they define the link between migration and welfare 
in social policy legislations. Figure 1.7 comparatively maps the type of access that 
non-national residents and non-resident nationals have to specific social benefits, 
when compared to national residents.
The figure confirms the pattern previously discussed according to which both 
immigrants and emigrants are sometimes excluded from certain welfare schemes 
(which are quite generalised across the EU) simply because the countries anal-
ysed here have not implemented yet such programs, not even for their resident 
nationals. Examples of such general grounds of exclusion that affect migrants 
and non- migrants alike can be identified in the area of unemployment benefits 
(especially unemployment assistance), non-contributory old-age pensions, social 
assistance, and family-related benefits (especially parental benefits, but also- less 
frequently- paternity and child benefits). The absence of such social protection 
schemes is particularly visible in Lebanon, which has not implemented yet spe-
cific programs for unemployment benefits, sickness cash benefits, social assis-
tance or several family- related benefits. To a lesser extent, this is also the case for 
China (still failing to provide sickness benefits in cash or paternity, parental, and 
child benefits) and Senegal (which has not integrated yet unemployment schemes 
or general social assistance programs for the most vulnerable).
Apart from these general limitations applicable to all groups, when it comes to 
immigrants in particular, our findings show that the contributory logic generally pre-
vails over nationality in access to welfare. In most countries and for almost all 
benefits—  regardless of their contributory/non-contributory nature –, nationality 
becomes an irrelevant factor once the wage-earning criterion is fulfilled. This con-
firms the trend of employment-driven inclusion of foreign workers in domestic wel-
fare systems already identified for other countries (see Vintila and Lafleur 2020 for 
EU Member States).
Yet, country chapters in this volume also discuss how different migration and 
labour-market conditions may still hinder foreign workers’ access to welfare even 
when national legislations do recognize them as eligible claimants. To begin with, 
the strong labour market informality across many countries analysed here stands 
out as an important obstacle for immigrants’ access to welfare. Secondly, foreign-
ers may  find it more difficult than nationals to comply with the period of prior 
employment that often conditions access to cash benefits, especially if we consider 
how language barriers or labour market discrimination practices could hinder their 
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Fig. 1.7 Access of national residents, non-national residents and non-resident nationals to social 
benefits. (Source: Own elaboration based on the MiTSoPro dataset (policies in place at the begin-
ning of 2019). A value of “2” indicates that the benefit exists in the country and the groups anal-
ysed here are entitled to access it upon fulfilment of the general eligibility conditions. A value of 
“1” indicates that the benefit exists, but only certain categories of individuals (such as only those 
originating from specific countries in the case of foreigners or only those affiliated to special 
schemes reserved for citizens abroad in the case of diaspora) can access it, instead of being open 
to all individuals from each group (i.e. all immigrants and emigrants, in general). A value of “0” 
indicates that individuals do not have access to a specific benefit. When all three groups analysed 
return the value “0” for a specific benefit, it means that the benefit does not exist in that specific 
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possibility to find stable jobs. Thirdly, since several benefits granted by these non-
EU countries cover formal workers only, migrants may find it hard to obtain this 
status in the first place especially since, unlike non-migrants, foreigners must first 
regularise their immigration status and obtain the right to work. As explained in 
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several chapters, the acquisition of the right to work sometimes requires a rather 
complicated administrative procedure (see chapters on Argentina and Tunisia; or 
the case of Ecuador where foreigners’ right to work in the private sector is condi-
tioned by the obtainment of a certificate from the Labour Ministry stating that their 
employment does not affect the national policy on employment and human 
resources).
Country chapters also illustrate instances of direct exclusion of foreigners 
from specific types of welfare rights. In some countries, non-national residents 
are not entitled to claim certain benefits, whereas in others, they must comply 
with additional eligibility conditions which do not apply for national residents. 
For instance, Bertolini and Clegg (this volume) discuss in this volume how non-
EEA citizens who are subject to immigration control in the UK are excluded by 
the terms of their visas from claiming social benefits that fall under the legal defi-
nition of ‘public funds’, including demogrants, means-tested benefits and tax 
credits. Similarly, foreigners are not entitled to claim social assistance in Serbia 
or China, as cash benefits for individuals in need are offered only to citizens of 
these countries. In the area of family benefits, the birth grants granted by Turkey 
are exclusively reserved for national  citizens, the same applying for the late 
maternity leave in China or the cash parental allowance in Serbia. Unlike their 
national counterparts, foreigners can access the Universal Child Allowance in 
Argentina only after three years of residence. In other countries, access to family 
benefits is allowed only for specific groups of foreigners as it happens in Lebanon, 
where only foreigners originating from countries that maintain a reciprocal treat-
ment for Lebanese nationals can receive maternity and child benefits.
A similar tendency of restrictiveness towards foreigners’ access to social assis-
tance or certain family benefits was also found across EU countries (Vintila and 
Lafleur 2020). Yet, some non-EU states show that this restrictiveness can be further 
extended to other policy areas in which foreigners generally benefit from equal 
treatment in the EU. One example is in the area of unemployment. Although for-
eigners can generally claim unemployment benefits under the same eligibility 
requirements as nationals in most countries analysed here, in Russia, they are still 
excluded as potential beneficiaries of cash benefits in case of job loss, thus being 
entitled only to job search services. Similarly, foreigners residing in India cannot 
claim the recently introduced Unemployment Assistance Scheme, as this program 
is exclusively reserved for Indian citizens; whereas in Turkey, unlike their national 
counterparts, non-nationals must have resided for at least a year to qualify for unem-
ployment benefits.
Certain instances of direct exclusion of non-national residents are also detected 
in the area of old-age pensions. As explained for the Indian case in this volume, 
foreigners cannot access the national pension scheme, whereas the chapter on 
Lebanon discusses how foreigners (except Palestinians with a valid work permit) 
are excluded from accessing the Lebanese end-of-service indemnity. Russia also 
excludes temporary foreign residents as potential beneficiaries of a contributory 
pension, and only those holding the permanent residence status (which can be 
claimed within three years after having obtained the temporary residence permit) 
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qualify for this pension. In some cases, access to non-contributory pensions is also 
restricted. By way of example, foreigners cannot access this pension in India, 
whereas the Turkish social assistance scheme for the elderly is reserved only for 
resident Turkish nationals. Carmona Barrenechea et al. (this volume) also show how 
non-contributory pensions in Argentina are granted to Argentine citizens or natu-
ralised migrants with at least 10 years of prior residence, or to foreigners with a 
minimum of 20 years of residence who continue to live in Argentina once the pen-
sion is granted. In other countries, only specific groups of foreigners are entitled to 
claim non-contributory pensions. For instance, Switzerland restricts the access to 
this pension only to nationals of EU or European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
countries who are permanent residents; whereas in Russia, only foreigners who are 
permanent residents and have lived in the country for at least 15 years can claim this 
pension.
Such examples demonstrate that many of these non-EU countries have opted 
for a more protectionist and restrictive stance when defining who is legally enti-
tled to claim welfare, this implicitly leading to more frequent instances of exclu-
sion of foreigners when compared to EU countries. Overall, India and Lebanon 
seem to put forward a more exclusionary approach towards immigrants, as the 
latter are entitled to claim very few of the welfare provisions implemented in 
these countries. The Indian case is particularly noteworthy as apart from mater-
nity benefits, foreigners do not qualify as eligible applicants for any of the other 
social protection schemes offered by the Indian government. At the opposite pole, 
in Morocco, Senegal or Tunisia, foreigners always have legal access to the wel-
fare entitlements analysed here although, as discussed, some of these coun-
tries— especially Senegal- a priori have fewer social protection schemes when 
compared to other countries. Yet, even when foreigners do have access to welfare 
under equal conditions as national residents, in some cases, the take-up of such 
benefits may  have negative consequences. As explained in this volume, the 
Russian Federal Migration Service may recall a previously issued residence per-
mit for foreigners who cannot provide for themselves or their families at a level 
that is higher than the regional poverty line. Similarly, foreigners living in 
Switzerland may lose their residence permits if receiving social aid. As shown in 
this book, as a result of a popular vote in 2014, new provisions now stipulate that 
Swiss residence permits are not issued to foreigners who apply for non-contribu-
tory benefits paid for old-age, survivors or disability via the federal complemen-
tary scheme, while foreign jobseekers (except for EU/EFTA) are excluded from 
claiming social assistance.
Despite of that, some country chapters also provide interesting examples of how 
certain states sometimes privilege specific migrant groups in their national legisla-
tions regulating access to welfare. This preferential treatment of certain nationalities 
operates either indirectly- by facilitating their access to residence permits and, 
implicitly, to work and welfare rights-, or directly— by granting them easier access 
to social benefits compared to other foreign nationalities. In some cases, this facili-
tated access derives from cooperation initiatives at the supranational level; in others, 
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it is the result of special (historical, political or strategical) ties with origin coun-
tries. By way of example, Argentina is part of the MERCOSUR Multilateral 
Agreement on Social Security10 with Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay. This agree-
ment covers access to health care, old-age and disability benefits and grants migrant 
domestic workers pension portability rights. MERCOSUR nationals residing in 
Argentina are also granted longer temporary residence permits compared to other 
nationalities, while also benefiting from lower visa fees. Similarly, Switzerland is 
part of the Agreement on Free Movement of Persons and the EFTA Convention aim-
ing to coordinate various national social security systems, offering equal treatment 
of nationals of the other signatory partners with Swiss citizens and covering a wide 
array of social insurance benefits. Until recently an EU Member State, the UK has 
granted access to most welfare rights to foreigners originating from EEA countries 
under the EU law; although many changes in this group’s access to social rights are 
likely to be introduced in the future. Preferential treatment of certain nationalities is 
also observed in Lebanon, where Palestinians are exempted from paying the work 
visa fees and, unlike other foreigners, they can also receive the end-of-service 
indemnity. This case is particularly interesting, especially since Lebanon stands out 
as the non-EU country from our sample that mostly restricts the pool of foreign resi-
dents who can access social protection. As explained in this volume, only foreigners 
originating from countries which provide equal treatment to Lebanese citizens 
based on a reciprocity clause are eligible to enroll in the National Social Security 
Fund that is the main provider of health care, end-of-service indemnity, and family 
benefits. However, this currently applies only for citizens of France, the UK, 
Belgium, and India. Finally, Russia also favours specific nationalities by granting 
them equal access to social security benefits (except for pensions). This applies to 
nationals of Belarus (based on a bilateral agreement) and nationals of countries of 
the Eurasian Economic Union (including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and 
Kyrgyzstan).
1.4.2  The Case of Non-Resident Nationals: Formal Exclusion 
from the Home Country’s Welfare Regime, 
with Some Exceptions
As mentioned, individuals’ employment status is a key element ensuring their 
access to social protection across the 13 countries analysed in this book. Often, this 
also implies residence in these countries, a requirement that directly excludes 
nationals living abroad as potential beneficiaries of welfare provisions from their 
countries of nationality. As discussed in the country chapters, when deciding to 
move abroad permanently, citizens of most of the countries examined here 
10 See: https://www.mercosur.int/. Accessed 16 March 2020.
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generally lose their entitlement for social benefits from the homeland. Residence in 
the country is usually mandatory to receive unemployment benefits, non-contribu-
tory pensions, and (most) family benefits, reason for which non-residents cannot 
access them from abroad. The same form of exclusion also operates in the area of 
social assistance: when specific social assistance programs exist (Fig.  1.7), they 
tend to be strictly linked to the residence principle (for instance, in Serbia) or even 
to local residence in particular areas of the country that grants them (see the exam-
ple of China). Overall, sending states’ restrictiveness towards diaspora’s access to 
welfare seems particularly visible in Lebanon, Senegal and, to a lower extent, also 
in Turkey and China where non-residents can claim very few welfare benefits.
Yet, there are three important exceptions from this general trend of restrictive-
ness towards diaspora populations. First, there are certain policy areas for which 
exportability is more frequently stipulated in national legislations. Figure 1.7 shows 
that all selected countries—  except for Lebanon11—  allow their nationals living 
abroad to continue receiving a contributory pension despite their physical absence. 
However, in some cases, there are certain limitations. For instance, exportability of 
contributory pensions from Serbia is allowed only when included in bilateral agree-
ments with destination countries. In Ecuador— which allows its nationals abroad to 
voluntarily contribute to the Ecuadorean pension scheme-, contributory pensions 
are not technically exportable, but they can still be accessed from abroad as long as 
the beneficiary keeps a bank account in Ecuador where the pension will be paid. 
Similar regulations apply for invalidity benefits, which represent the second most 
important exception to the strong link between welfare and residence in a country. 
States such as Argentina, Morocco, Russia (only for the contributory disability pen-
sion), the UK (with restrictions) or Serbia (only when covered by bilateral agree-
ments) allow for the exportability of invalidity benefits. In any case, this flexibility 
of states in allowing the exportability of old-age pensions or invalidity benefits is 
not peculiar to these countries, being frequently observed also among EU Member 
States (Vintila and Lafleur 2020).
A second relevant exception rests in a series of policy innovations that several 
non-EU states have developed in the attempt to respond to the social protection 
needs of their diaspora. Such policies often consist in facilitating non-residents’ 
access to the homeland social protection regime. Figure  1.7 highlights a clear 
example in this regard in the area of health care. Most non-EU countries analysed 
here authorize their non-resident citizens to maintain some type of health coverage 
in the homeland, mainly by allowing them to continue paying contributions from 
abroad that open access to the healthcare system back in origin countries. Such 
policy innovations can also  refer to the design of ad-hoc schemes for citizens 
abroad, that are different from the general welfare programs accessible to resi-
dents. In the field of health care, India recently introduced a specific insurance 
scheme— the Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana- aiming to ensure the protection of 
11 As explained in the country chapters, the Lebanese public pension schemes only covers a very 
limited segment of non-resident nationals, namely civil servants and those working in the military.
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Indian workers abroad in destination countries where they have limited welfare 
rights (e.g. Gulf countries). This scheme covers insured workers for accidental 
death, permanent disability leading to loss of employment while abroad, repatria-
tion, and reimbursement of hospitalisation costs. India also created the Indian 
Community Welfare Fund (ICWF), a means-tested social assistance initiative aim-
ing to respond to exceptional hardship faced by nationals abroad. Other countries 
also put forward similar schemes specifically designed to address diasporas’ social 
risks. For instance, Tunisia created a program that allows its citizens who work in 
destination countries with which Tunisia has not signed a social security agreement 
to voluntarily join the Tunisian insurance system. This provides health coverage to 
both the Tunisian worker living abroad (during temporary stays in Tunisia, for 
instance) and to family members remaining in Tunisia. On a much more limited 
scale, Morocco also set up a specific program called “Marhaba” that grants access 
to health care to citizens residing abroad who return temporarily to Morocco dur-
ing the summer. In the field of pensions, Serbian authorities have responded to the 
needs of Serbian citizens who work abroad and are not compulsory insured in 
destination countries by allowing them to voluntarily join the Serbian pension 
insurance scheme. As for social assistance, Switzerland created a separate scheme 
for non-resident nationals who are in a situation of need and cannot support 
themselves.
Thirdly, beyond general exportability and/or specific social protection schemes 
for the diaspora, country chapters in this volume also show how sending states’ 
responsiveness to nationals abroad is often reflected in the bilateral or multilateral 














Fig. 1.8 Number of bilateral social security agreements signed by non-EU countries. (Source: 
Own elaboration based on the MiTSoPro dataset)
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social security agreements they engage in. Such agreements usually grant certain 
migrant groups with an extra layer of protection when compared to what domestic 
social security legislations provide to all migrants in general (Sabates-Wheeler and 
Koettl 2010). Regarding multilateral forms of cooperation, the examples of 
MERCOSUR (for Argentina) and the EFTA Convention and the Agreement on Free 
Movement of Persons (for Switzerland) clearly illustrate how multilateral social 
security arrangements can improve the access to social protection of nationals of 
signing partners. As for bilateral arrangements, Fig. 1.8 shows that Turkey, Serbia, 
the UK, India, and Switzerland have been particularly pro-active in engaging in 
bilateral social security cooperation, whereas Senegal and Lebanon signed very few 
conventions in this area. However, the country chapters also show that there is still 
substantial variation in the types of benefits that these agreements actually cover; as 
well as in the way these states managed to secure social security agreements with 
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Fig. 1.9 Non-EU sending states’ welfare inclusiveness for immigrant and emigrant populations. 
(Source: Own elaboration based on MiTSoPro data. The horizontal axis captures states’ inclusive-
ness towards immigrants, whereas the vertical axis refers to emigrants. Both axes are calculated 
based on the average values of inclusiveness/restrictiveness of access that they return for each 
policy area (see details in Fig. 1.7))
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1.4.3  Protecting Immigrants and Emigrants: A Trade-Off 
for Welfare States?
Figure 1.9 summarises our comparative findings regarding the inclusiveness of the 
selected non-EU states regarding the access of migrant populations to their domes-
tic welfare systems. In terms of general social protection provision, our findings 
indicate that none of these countries have put forward very inclusive social protec-
tion regimes for both immigrants and emigrants at the same time. Almost all of 
them— except for India- actually seem more inclined to grant access to social ben-
efits for their non-national residents when compared to non-resident nationals. The 
principle of territoriality remains a key element conditioning welfare entitlement in 
these countries; and it generally seems to be a more relevant factor for accessing 
social protection than nationality. Moreover, the fact that most of these countries 
usually  allow their diaspora to access very limited welfare provisions from the 
homeland could also be linked to the fact that, as explained above, a significant 
share of their nationals abroad reside in high-income destination countries which 
often have strong welfare regimes.
Figure 1.9 also allows us to identity two clusters of countries. A first cluster 
includes states that put forward a rather restrictive approach to both immigrants and 
emigrants alike, as they offer few welfare benefits to mobile individuals. This group 
includes Lebanon, India, Turkey, China, and Senegal. With the exception of Lebanon 
(which returns a very sizeable foreign community, with immigrants representing 
16.6% of the population), the rest of the countries in this first cluster host relatively 
few foreigners, with non-national residents accounting for less than 2% of the popu-
lation. In Lebanon and Senegal, this rather restrictive attitude vis-à-vis immigrants’ 
access to welfare— and their implicitly protectionist approach regarding the social 
protection of resident citizens- is perhaps unsurprising considering that these coun-
tries a priori have rather fragile social protection systems and limited resources to 
be allocated to the area of welfare. As mentioned, both countries return quite low 
levels of social protection expenditure. Senegal also stands out by its high share of 
informal employment, worrying poverty levels, and limited gross national income 
per capita; although it still adopts a more inclusive stance towards immigrants’ 
access to benefits when compared to Lebanon. Although India also falls in this first 
cluster- and it shares certain socio-economic features with Senegal or Lebanon, 
such as the high labour market informality and poverty levels-, this country still 
scores slightly higher than other non-EU states in terms of welfare provisions 
offered to its population residing abroad.
The remaining non-EU states included in this volume form a second cluster. 
They share a common denominator in the fact that seem more inclusive towards 
immigrants than emigrants when it comes to granting them access to the domestic 
welfare system. Many of these states allow foreigners (especially foreign workers) 
to claim social benefits, but they remain reluctant to extend such benefits to their 
nationals residing abroad. Within this second group, Argentina, the UK, and 
Switzerland seem the most inclusive countries towards immigrants’ access to social 
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protection. As discussed by Margheritis (this volume), Argentina has been histori-
cally considered as an immigration country, this approach being closely linked to 
Argentina’s state and nation-building processes. On the other hand, both the UK and 
Switzerland stand out in our sample as countries returning high shares of foreigners 
in the total population. As previously mentioned, Serbia and Russia also report quite 
sizeable non-national groups; and, in general, they are relatively inclusive when it 
comes to allowing foreigners to access their social protection system.
Going back to diaspora populations, our findings indicate that most non-EU 
sending states return rather moderate or even limited responsiveness to non- 
residents’ social protection. The majority of them have not even developed specific 
policies by which their consular authorities (or other homeland institutions) are 
required to assist citizens abroad when applying for home or host country welfare 
benefits. Among these, China and Morocco, however, have an explicit policy of 
financially supporting not-for-profit organizations which assist nationals abroad in 
the area of social protection. On the other hand, Switzerland and Tunisia do have 
formal policies that clearly identify— but only in very general terms— a formal 
responsibility for homeland authorities to support citizens abroad in their applica-
tion process for accessing welfare. Such homeland assistance is even stronger for 
Ecuador and Turkey, as both states identify specific missions of social protection 
assistance. As discussed in this volume, Ecuador created the position of representa-
tive of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman that advises and supports citi-
zens abroad to access rights in the home and host countries; whereas Turkey has 
created the position of attaché of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in 
consulates, with the aim of assisting citizens abroad to access welfare.
In addition to what they provide to nationals abroad or how they facilitate non- 
residents’ access to welfare, some of these countries have also put forward a quite 
extensive institutional framework to engage with diaspora populations. While this 
framework may not appear, at first sight, as directly related to welfare concerns, the 
existence of such institutions provides us an indication of the visibility of diaspora 
issues in homeland politics. In our introduction to the second volume of this book 
series (Lafleur and Vintila 2020c), we used the concept of descriptive infrastructure 
to describe the set of “home country institutions that explicitly acknowledge the 
diaspora as main reason for their existence, while formally being granted the mis-
sion to act in its interests (including specific social protection interests)”. More pre-
cisely, we identified three types of institutions: consulates (excluding honorary 
consulates), governmental institutions (at the ministry and sub-ministry levels, spe-
cifically acknowledging the diaspora in their name, while also acting in emigration- 
related issues) and interest-representation institutions (members of Parliament 
elected by citizens abroad and official consultative bodies and mechanisms allowing 
the diaspora to voice its concerns).
Looking at the existence of such institutions across the 13 non-EU countries 
analysed here, we observe a quite mixed picture. Table 1.4 shows us that not all 
these countries count with an equal representation abroad. The two countries with a 
long history of post-war emigration to the EU— Morocco and Turkey— return the 
strongest consular presence in their top five destination countries. However, as 
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discussed in this volume, the quality of the assistance offered by Moroccan consul-
ates abroad has often been questioned by its beneficiaries, this triggering Morocco’s 
attention and efforts in trying to improve its consular services. As previously shown 
in Fig. 1.5, the Moroccan diaspora is more evenly distributed across different EU 
countries (for instance, 33% of all Moroccans living abroad reside in France, 25% 
in Spain and 13% in Italy), whereas more than a half of the Turkish diaspora con-
centrates in a single destination country (Germany). Morocco also seems to be more 
responsive in terms of allowing its nationals abroad to access homeland benefits 
(Fig. 1.9), although Turkey has implemented a more developed consular assistance 
in the area of social protection for its non-resident citizens. At the opposite pole, 
India and Lebanon return the lowest number of consulates in top destination coun-
tries, although the weight of their diaspora over the total population varies from 
0.3% in India to 9.1% in Lebanon, respectively. On the other hand, countries such 
as China, Argentina, Senegal or Russia, in which non-resident nationals count with 
a limited demographic share (less than 3% of the population), return more than 15 
consulates in their top five destination countries. In some cases, this number is not 
necessarily reflecting those states’ interest in the needs of their citizens abroad, but 
rather their desire to increase their economic and political influence. As discussed in 
this volume, this seems to be the case for China: its diaspora population has histori-
cally played a fundamental role in the modernisation and development projects 
implemented in China, with a strong state emphasis on encouraging investment and 
return of highly skilled Chinese from overseas.
Table 1.4 also shows that very few of these countries have created ministry-level 
institutions for their nationals abroad. Currently, such institutions exist  only in 
Lebanon, Senegal, and Ecuador, countries that actually provide limited access to 
Table 1.4 Diaspora institutional framework of non-EU selected states
Country















Argentina 19 No Yes No No
China 28 No Yes No Yes
Ecuador 23 Yes Yes Yes Yes
India 12 No Yes No Yes
Lebanon 12 Yes Yes No Yes
Morocco 41 No Yes No Yes
Russian F. 17 No Yes No Yes
Senegal 14 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Serbia 15 No Yes No Yes
Switzerland 17 No Yes No Yes
Tunisia 15 No Yes Yes No
Turkey 33 No Yes No Yes
UK 28 No No No No
Source: Own elaboration based on MiTSoPro data
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homeland welfare benefits for their diaspora. As they ensure visibility at the highest 
governmental level and usually come with budgets for diaspora-related issues, these 
ministries are providing very clear indications of homeland’s interests in this matter. 
However, because of their political nature, such institutions are also the ones that are 
most likely to come and go as governments (or their priorities) change. This volatility 
is illustrated with the examples of India, Morocco, China or Serbia, states which had 
ministries for the diaspora, but no longer do. Sub-ministry level institutions, on the 
contrary, are present in almost all countries examined, which reflects their concern 
for having a stable and dedicated institution at the executive level to deal with dias-
pora issues. Most of these institutions are hierarchically dependent on the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Yet, the fact that sub-ministerial institutions in Tunisia and 
Turkey are depending on the Labour and Social Affairs Ministries can be interpreted 
as a way to dedicate greater focus and expertise to labour migrants and their access 
to welfare. Lastly, the analysis of interest-representation institutions also produces a 
mixed picture, as only three states (Ecuador, Tunisia, and Senegal) allow citizens 
abroad to elect their own members of Parliament. Interestingly, Ecuador and Tunisia 
introduced such diaspora representation mechanism following regimes changes, 
therefore indicating how engagement with citizens abroad is reflective of a broader 
change in the way homeland authorities define their policies. On the contrary, almost 
all countries in our sample— except for Argentina, Tunisia, and the UK— have an 
explicit policy and/or institution that allows non-residents to voice their concern to 
homeland authorities in a non-binding manner (e.g. consultative bodies).
Overall, this comparative overview thus reveals interesting variations in the level 
of institutionalization of diaspora relations across non-EU states. Ecuador and 
Senegal have developed the most extensive institutional network for their diaspora 
but, as discussed in the country chapters, only Ecuador has accompanied these insti-
tutions with actual social protection policies for citizens abroad. Furthermore, the 
Senegalese case is particularly interesting as although the Senegalese diaspora is not 
very sizeable, it nonetheless has a strong economic leverage due to the high share of 
remittances from abroad. This trend confirms, as also suggested in past studies on 
diaspora institutions (Gamlen 2019), that creating such institutions may serve as a 
tool to signal to the diaspora that their homeland cares about them. A purely sym-
bolic approach to diaspora institutions can therefore reflect the authorities’ attempt 
to instrumentalize non-resident populations to pursue a specific economic or politi-
cal agenda. In our sample, such strategic approach is also visible in the case of 
Lebanon, which created a dedicated ministry for its diaspora, does not grant social 
benefits to nationals abroad, but still designed policies to attract remittances and 
diaspora investments back to Lebanon.
1.5  Structure of the Volume
The rest of the book includes 26 country chapters, two per each country analyzed. 
One chapter discusses the conditions of access to welfare for resident nationals, 
non-resident nationals, and non-national residents, whereas the second one focuses 
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on diaspora policies and institutions for nationals abroad. For each country, the first 
chapter starts by providing readers with a contextualization of each case study in 
terms of key characteristics of their national welfare systems and migration trajec-
tories. This introductory section is followed by an in-depth analysis of the main 
eligibility conditions under which individuals can access social benefits across five 
policy areas: unemployment, health care, old-age pensions, family-related benefits, 
and guaranteed minimum resources. For each country, the authors discuss how for-
eigners can access these benefits when compared to their national counterparts, 
while also explaining which welfare entitlements are made available for citizens 
living abroad.
The second chapter for each country is designed to complement the first one by 
focusing on diaspora policies and institutions that these non-EU states have devel-
oped for their nationals abroad. The first part of these chapters starts with a brief 
discussion of the characteristics of the diaspora and its relations with the homeland. 
They then dedicate more attention to key institutions and policies (outside of social 
protection policies) that regulate these relations. In the second part, authors first 
discuss the general framework in which sending states develop social protection 
policies for citizens abroad (consular policies, bilateral social security agreements, 
membership in regional organizations, etc.); and proceed with the identification of 
key policies for this population across several policy areas. The chapters conclude 
by reiterating key factors that explain the development of each country’s diaspora 
policies and institutions.
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